A Rational Argument for Morality

Introduction

In Enlightenment Now and Rationality, Pinker (2018, 2021) presents a rational argument for morality. In this post, I present his argument.

Rationality and Self-Interest

Pinker argues that rational agents are self-interested. In particular, he argues that rational agents desire to preserve their own interests, “prefer[ing] good things to happen to [them]selves over bad things” (Pinker, 2021, Chapter 2). If so, then rational agents should be moral if the preservation of their self-interests requires them to be moral.

Rationality and Sociality

Pinker also argues that rational agents are social. In particular, he argues that “we are social animals who live with other people, rather than Robinson Crusoe on a desert island, so our well-being depends on what others do, like helping us when we are in need and not harming us for no good reason” (Pinker, 2021, Chapter 2).

Self-Interest, Sociality and Morality

Pinker also argues that social agents’ self-interests are preserved only if they are moral. To paraphrase, social agents who are immoral will not have their self-interests preserved. In particular, he argues that “if [a social agent] refuses to play the game of morality, then in the eyes of everyone else he has become a mindless menace, like a germ, a wildfire, or a rampaging wolverine – something to be neutralised by brute force, no questions asked” (Pinker, 2018, Chapter 23).

Conclusion

Pinker concludes that rational agents should be moral. Because rational agents are social, and social agents’ self-interests are preserved only if they are moral, rational agents’ self-interests are also preserved only if they are moral. Therefore, because rational agents are self-interested, they should be moral.

References

Pinker, S. (2018). Enlightenment now: The case for reason, science, humanism, and progress. Penguin Books.

Pinker, S. (2021). Rationality: What it is, Why it seems scarce, Why it matters. Penguin Books.