The Problem with Counterfeit People

In The Problem with Counterfeit People, Daniel Dennett argues that “we must outlaw […] the creation of counterfeit people”. In particular, he argues that “reating counterfeit digital people risks destroying our civilisation”. In the present post, I outline his argument that the creation of counterfeit digital people risks destroying our civilisation.
Democracy is epistemically reliable only if citizens are informed. In other words, if citizens are not informed, then democracy is epistemically unreliable. Dennett argues that “[d]emocracy depends on the informed […] consent of the governed”. I interpret his argument to mean that the epistemic reliability of “[d]emocracy depends on the informed […] consent of the governed”. Indeed, in The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rosseau argues as follows:

If, when properly informed, the people were to come to its decisions without any communication between its members, the general will would always emerge from the large number of small differences, and the decision would always be good.

If counterfeit digital people are created, then citizens will not be informed. Suppose that counterfeit digital people are created. If citizens do not turn off their attention, then Dennett argues that “counterfeit people will talk [them] into adopting policies and convictions that will make [them] vulnerable to still more manipulation”. And if citizens do turn off our attention, then he argues that [they] will “become passive and ignorant pawns”. In other words, if citizens do not turn off their attention, they will be misinformed. And if citizens do turn off their attention, they will be uninformed. In either case, citizens will not be informed.
If counterfeit digital people are created, then democracy is epistemically unreliable. This is because if counterfeit ditigal people are created, then citizens are not informed. And if citizens are not informed, then democracy is epistemically unreliable.
If democracy is epistemically unreliable, then civilisation risks being destroyed. Dennett seems to assume that citizens will not be governed under a system of democracy if democracy is epistemically unreliable, that citizens’ “freedom” will be “destroy[ed]” if they are not governed under a system of democracy, and that their civilisation risks being destroyed if their freedom is destroyed. However, even if the first and third assumptions are true, it is possible that democracy is not as essential to freedom as the second assumption implies.