Abjection and Pride

In Ethics, Spinoza argues that “although abjection is contrary to pride, an abject person is nevertheless very close to a proud person” (Part IV, Proposition 57 Scholium; Part IV, Appendix 22). I argue that if an individual is abject, then he is proud.

An individual is abject if he feels sad if he believes that he is inferior to another individual. In other words, abjection is “sadness arising from a person’s false belief that he is beneath others” (Book IV, Proposition 57 Scholium). If an individual feels sad if he believes that he is inferior to another individual, then he feels joy if he believes that he is superior to the other individual. In other words, “[s]ince his sadness arises from his estimating his own powerlessness by the power or virtue of others, his sadness will be relieved […] if his imagination is occupied in contemplating other people’s faults” (Book IV, Proposition 57 Scholium). Therefore, if an individual is abject, then he feels joy if he believes that he is superior to another individual.

An individual is proud if he feels joy if he believes that he is superior to another individual. In other words, “[p]ride is joy arising from a person’s thinking too well of himself” (Book IV, Proposition 57 Proof) or “from a person’s false opinion that he is a cut above other people” (Book IV, Proposition 57, Scholium). Therefore, if an individual is abject, then he is proud.