The Irrationality of Anger

It is irrational for me to be angry at someone else for the occurrence of an event to which I am averse.

If I am rational and I am averse to the event, then the event will not occur. This is because if I am rational, then I am averse to an event only if it is within my control. And if I am averse to an event and it is within my control, then the event will not occur. If I am angry at someone else for the occurrence of an event to which I am averse, then the event occurs and I am averse to the event. If so, then I am not rational. Therefore, if I am angry at someone else for the occurrence of an event to which I am averse, then I am irrational.

Further, if someone else causes the occurrence of an event, then either he did intend to cause me pain or he did not intend to cause me pain. If he did intend to cause me pain, then either he has suffered or he will suffer. The first prong of the disjunction is implied from the principle that an individual intends to cause another individual pain only if he has suffered; and the second prong of the disjunction is implied from the principle that an individual who intends to cause another individual pain through an action and who performs the action will suffer. If either he has suffered or he will suffer, then there is no need to be angry at him. And if he did not intend to cause me pain, then there is also no need to be angry at him.