Understanding the Nature of Envy

The green-eyed monster appears often and without warning. Envy permeates our lives. In this post, I meditate on the nature of envy.

Envy is a set of cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses to another person’s possession of something we value. Lange, Weidman and Crusius (2018) define envy as a “burdensome pain about being inferior to another person” that entails either “a longing to improve oneself and emulate the envied person” or “hostile thoughts and intentions directed at harming the other” (p. 592). Cohen-Charash and Larson (2017) define envy as “a painful emotion” that involves the beliefs that “one lacks a desired object that another person has” and that “the desired object is important to the person’s self-concept or competitive position”, and the motivation to “reduce the pain it entails” and to “improve one’s relative standing” (p. 175).

These definitions, among others mentioned below, suggest that if an individual (A) is envious of an individual (B) over a good (G), then

A experiences pain;
A desires G but does not possess G;
A desires that B does not possess G but B possesses G; and
A believes that he is inferior to G.

First, if A is envious of B over G, then A experiences pain. This is expressed in the phrases “burdensome pain” (Lange, Weidman & Crusius, 2018, p. 592) and “painful emotion” (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017, p. 175). This is also expressed in the Rhetoric in which Aristotle defines envy as “pain at the good fortune of others” and in Ethics in which Spinoza defines envy as “hate” or “sadness”.

Second, if A is envious of B over G, then A desires G but does not possess G. The proposition that if A is envious of B over G, then A desires G is implied in the Pain-Driven Dual Envy Theory which states that individuals that have higher levels of envy also have higher levels of desire and longing for the desired object(s) (Table 3, Figure 3 & Figure 4; Lange, Weidman & Crusius, 2018). It is also expressed in the phrase “desired object” (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017, p. 175). The proposition that if A is envious of B over G, then A does not possess G is implied in the word “longing” (Lange, Weidman & Crusius, 2018, p. 592). If an individual longs for a goal, then the individual does not possess the goal. It is also expressed in the phrase “one lacks a desired object” (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017, p. 175).

Third, if A is envious of B over G, then A desires that B does not possess G but B possesses G. The proposition that if A is envious of B over G, then A desires that B does not possess G is implied in the Pain-Driven Dual Envy Theory which states that individuals that have higher levels of envy also have stronger wishes that “something bad happens to the [envied] person” (Table 3, Figure 3 & Figure 4; Lange, Weidman & Crusius, 2018). If an individual wishes that “something bad happens to the [envied] person” over G, then he desires that the person does not possess G. It is also implied in Ethics in which Spinoza argues that individuals who are envious are “glad at [another’s] ill fortune”. If an individual is “glad at [another’s] ill fortune” over G, then he desires that the other does not possess G. The proposition that if A is envious of B over G, then B possess G is expressed in the phrase “one lacks a desired object that another person has” (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017, p. 175). It is also expressed in the sentence that envy “occurs when a person does not possess a valued commodity” (Guerrero and Andersen, 1998, p. 36).

Last, if A is envious of B over G, then A believes that he is inferior to G. This is implied in the Pain-Driven Dual Envy Theory which states that individuals with higher levels of envy also have stronger feelings of helplessness and inadequacy and a greater lack of self-confidence (Table 3, Figure 3 & Figure 4; Lange, Weidman & Crusius, 2018). If an individual feels helpless and inadequate and lacks self-confidence because he does not possess a desired goal which another does, then he believes that he is inferior to G. It is also implied in the phrase “improve one’s relative standing” (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017, p. 175). If an individual desires to improve his relative standing to another, then he believes that he is inferior to the other.

References

Cohen-Charash, Y., & Larson, E. C. (2017). An emotion divided: Studying envy is better than studying “benign” and “malicious” envy. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(2), 174-183.

Guerrero, L. K., & Andersen, P. A. (1998). The dark side of jealousy and envy: Desire, delusion, desperation, and destructive communication. In B. H. Spitzberg & W. R. Cupach (Eds.), The dark side of close relationships (pp. 33–70). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Lange, J., Weidman, A. C., & Crusius, J. (2018). The painful duality of envy: Evidence for an integrative theory and a meta-analysis on the relation of envy and schadenfreude. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(4), 572.